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Abstract—Pathogenic Social Media (PSM) accounts such as
terrorist supporters exploit large communities of supporters for
conducting attacks on social media. Early detection of these
accounts is crucial as they are high likely to be key users in
making a harmful message “viral”. In this paper, we make the
first attempt on utilizing causal inference to identify PSMs within
a short time frame around their activity. We propose a time-decay
causality metric and incorporate it into a causal community
detection-based algorithm. The proposed algorithm is applied
to groups of accounts sharing similar causality features and is
followed by a classification algorithm to classify accounts as PSM
or not. Unlike existing techniques that take significant time to
collect information such as network, cascade path, or content, our
scheme relies solely on action log of users. Results on a real-world
dataset from Twitter demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency of
our approach. We achieved precision of 0.84 for detecting PSMs
only based on their first 10 days of activity; the misclassified
accounts were then detected 10 days later.
Index Terms—Causal inference, community detection,
pathogenic social media accounts, early identification
I. INTRODUCTION
The unregulated nature and rapid growth of the Web have
raised numerous challenges, including hate speech [1], human
trafficking [2] and disinformation spread [3] which ultimately
pose threats to users privacy [4], [5]. Take disinformation
spread as an example where “Pathogenic Social Media” (PSM)
accounts (e.g., terrorist supporters, or fake news writers) [3]
seek to promote or degrade certain ideas by utilizing large on-
line communities of supporters to reach their goals. Identifying
PSMs has applications including countering terrorism [6], [7],
fake news detection [8], [9] and water armies detection [10].
Early detection of PSMs in social media is crucial as they
are likely to be key users to malicious campaigns [11]. This is
a challenging task for three reasons. First, these platforms are
primarily based on reports they receive from their own users1
to manually shut down PSMs which is not a timely approach.
Despite efforts to suspend these accounts, many of them
simply return to social media with different accounts. Second,
the available data is often imbalanced and social network
structure, which is at the core of many techniques [12]–[15],
is not readily available. Third, PSMs often seek to utilize
U.S. Provisional Patent 62/628,196. Contact shak@asu.edu for licensing
information.
1https://bit.ly/2Dq5i4M
and cultivate large number of online communities of passive
supporters to spread as much harmful information as they can.
Present Work. Causal inference is tailored to identify PSMs
since they are key users in making a harmful message “viral”–
where “viral” is defined as an order-of-magnitude increase. We
propose time-decay causal metrics to distinguish PSMs from
normal users within a short time around their activity. Our
metrics alone can achieve high classification performance in
identification of PSMs soon after they perform actions. Next,
we pose the following research question: Are causality scores
of users within a community higher than those across different
communities? We propose a causal community detection-based
classification method (C2DC), that takes causality of users and
the community structure of their action log.
Contributions. We make the following major contributions:
• We enrich the causal inference framework of [16] and
present time-decay extensions of the causal metrics in [3]
for early identification of PSMs.
• We investigate the role of community structure in early
detection of PSMs, by demonstrating that users within a
community establish stronger causal relationships com-
pared to the rest.
• We conduct a suit of experiments on a dataset from
Twitter. Our metrics reached F1-score of 0.6 in identi-
fying PSMs, half way their activity, and identified 71%
of PSMs based on first 10 days of their activity, via
supervised settings. The community detection approach
achieved precision of 0.84 based on first 10 days of users
activity; the misclassified accounts were identified based
on their activity of 10 more days.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Technical Preliminaries
Following the convention of [17], we assume an action
log A of the form Actions(User,Action,Time), which contains
tuples (u, au, tu) indicating that user u has performed action
au at time tu. For ease of exposition, we slightly abuse the
notation and use the tuple (u,m, t) to indicate that user u
has posted (tweeted/retweeted) message m at time t. For a
given message m we define a cascade of actions as Am =
{(u,m′, t) ∈ A|m′ = m}.
User u is said to be an m-participant if there exists tu such
that (u,m, tu) ∈ A. For users who have adopted a message in
the early stage of its life span, we define key users as follows.978-1-5386-7848-0/18/$31.00 2018 IEEE
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Definition 1 (Key Users). Given message m, m-participant
u and cascade Am, we say user u is a key user iff user u
precedes at least φ fraction of other m-participants where
φ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, |Am| × φ ≤ |{j|∃t′ : (j,m, t′) ∈
A ∧ t < t′}|, where |.| is the cardinality of a set.
Next, we define viral messages as follows.
Definition 2 (Viral Messages). Given a threshold θ, we say
a message m ∈M is viral iff |Am| ≥ θ. We denote a set of
all viral messages by Mvir.
The prior probability of a message going viral is ρ =
|Mvir|/|M|. The probability of a message going viral given
key user u has participated in, is computed as follows:
ρu =
|{m|m ∈Mvir ∧ u is a key user}|
|{m|m ∈M ∧ u is a key user}| (1)
The probability that key users i and j tweet/retweet message
m chronologically and make it viral, is computed as:
pi,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t, t′ : t < t′ ∧ (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ A}|
|{m ∈M|∃t, t′ : t < t′ ∧ (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ A}| (2)
To examine how causal user i was in helping a message m
going viral, we shall explore what will happen if we exclude
user i from m. We define the probability that only key user j
has made a message m viral, i.e. user i has not posted m or
does not precede j as:
p¬i,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t′ : (j,m, t′) ∈ A ∧ @t : t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ A}|
|{m ∈M|∃t′ : (j,m, t′) ∈ A ∧ @t : t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ A}|
(3)
Next, we adopt the notion of Prima Facie causes [18]:
Definition 3 (Prima Facie Causal Users). A user u is said
to be Prima Facie causal user for cascade Am iff: (1) user u
is a key user of m, (2) m ∈Mvir, and (3) ρu > ρ.
We borrow the concept of related users from a rule-based
system [19] which was an extension to the causal inference
framework in [16]. We say users i and j are m-related if (1)
both are Prima Facie causal for m, and (2) i precedes j. We
then define a set of user i’s related users as R(i) = {j|j 6=
i and i, j are m-related}.
B. Dataset
We collect a dataset (Table I) of 53M ISIS related
tweets/retweets in Arabic, from Feb 22, 2016 to May 27,
2016. The dataset has different fields including user ID,
retweet ID, hashtags, content, posting time. The tweets were
collected using 290 different hashtags such as #Terrorism
and #StateOfTheIslamicCaliphate. We use a subset of this
dataset which contains 35K cascades of different sizes and
durations. There are ∼2.8M tweets/retweets associated with
the cascades. After pre-processing and removing duplicate
users from cascades, cascades sizes (i.e. number of associated
postings) vary between 20 to 9,571 and take from 10 seconds
to 95 days to finish. The log-log distribution of cascades vs.
cascade size and the cumulative distribution of duration of
cascades are depicted in Figure 1.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET.
Name Value
# of Cascades 35K
# of Viral Cascades 6,602
# of Tweets/Retweets 2,808,878
# of Users Suspended Active
64,484 536,609
Based on the content of tweets in our dataset, PSMs are
terrorism-supporting accounts who have participated in viral
cascades. We chose to use θ = 100 and take ∼6K viral
cascades with at least 100 tweets/retweets. We demonstrate
number of PSMs that have been suspended by the Twitter over
time and total number of suspended users in each cascade, in
Figure 1. We experiment the effectiveness of our proposed
approach on subsets of the training set with different sizes.
Note we use no more than 50% of original dataset to ensure
our approach is able to identify PSMs early enough. The
dataset does not have any underlying network. We only focus
on the non-textual information in the form of an action log. We
set φ = 0.5 to select key users and after the data collection, we
check through Twitter API whether they have been suspended
(PSM) or they are active (normal) [20]. According to Table I,
11% of the users in our dataset are PSM and others are normal.
C. Causal Measures
Causal inference framework was first introduced in [16].
Later, [3] adopted the framework and extended it to suite
the problem of identifying PSMs. They extend the Kleinberg-
Mishra causality (K&M ) to a series of causal metrics. To
recap, we briefly explain them in the following discussion.
Before going any further, K&M is computed as follows:
K&M (i) =
∑
j∈R(i)(pi,j − p¬i,j)
|R(i)| (4)
This metric measures how causal user i is, by taking the
average of pi,j − p¬i,j over R(i). The intuition here is user
i is more likely to be cause of message m to become viral
than user j, if pi,j − p¬i,j > 0. The work of [3] devised
a suit of the variants, namely relative likelihood causality
(rel), neighborhood-based causality (nb) and its weighted
version (wnb). Note that none of these metrics were originally
introduced for early identification of PSMs. Therefore, we
shall make slight modifications to their notations to adjust our
temporal formulations, using calligraphic uppercase letters. We
define EK&M over a given time interval I as follows:
EIK&M (i) =
∑
j∈R(i)(Pi,j − P¬i,j)
|R(i)| (5)
where R(i), Pi,j , and P¬i,j are now defined over I . Authors
in [3] mention that this metric cannot spot all PSMs. They
define another metric, relative likelihood causality Erel, which
works by assessing relative difference between Pi,j , and P¬i,j .
We use its temporal version over I , EIrel(i) = S(i,j)|R(i)| .
101 102 103 104 105
Cascades Size
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
#
 o
f C
as
ca
de
s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Duration of Cascade (s) 1e6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
#
 o
f C
as
ca
de
s
1e4
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage of Training
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
#
 o
f i
na
ct
iv
e 
us
er
s
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Cascade 1e4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
#
 o
f i
na
ct
iv
e 
us
er
s
1e4
Fig. 1. Left to right: Log-log distribution of cascades vs. cascade size. Cumulative distribution of duration of cascades. Number of inactive users in different
subsets of the training set. Total inactive users in each cascade.
TABLE II
F1-SCORE RESULTS FOR PSM ACCOUNTS USING EACH CAUSAL METRIC
IN [3].
Metric F1-score
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
EIK&M 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.49
EIrel 0.3 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37
EInb 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.55
EIwnb 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.59
Fig. 2. An illustration of how decay-based causality works. To compute ξIk(i)
over I = [t0, t], we use a sliding window ∆ = [t′−δ, t′] and take the average
between the resultant causality scores e−σ(t−t
′) × E∆k (i).
where S(i, j) is defined as follows and α is infinitesimal:
S(i, j) =
{ Pi,j
P¬i,j+α − 1, Pi,j > P¬i,j
1− P¬i,jPi,j , Pi,j ≤ P¬i,j
(6)
Two other neighborhood-based metrics were also defined
in [3], whose temporal variants are computed over I as
EInb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j) EIK&M (i)
|Q(j)| , where Q(j) = {i|j ∈ R(i)} is
the set of all users that user j belongs to their related users
sets. Similarly, the second metric is a weighted version of
the above metric and is called weighted neighborhood-based
causality and is calculated as EIwnb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j) wi×EIK&M (i)∑
i∈Q(j) wi
.
This is to capture different impacts that users in Q(j) have
on user j. We apply a threshold-based selection approach that
selects PSMs from normal users, based on a given threshold.
Following [3], we use a threshold of 0.7 for all metrics except
EIrel for which we used a threshold of 7 (Table II).
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Leveraging Temporal Aspects of Causality
Previous causal metrics do not take into account time-decay
effect. They assume a steady trend for computing causality
scores. This is an unrealistic assumption, as causality of users
may change over time. We introduce a generic decay-based
metric. Our metric assigns different weights to different time
points of a given time interval, inversely proportional to their
distance from t (i.e., smaller distance is associated with higher
weight). Specifically, it performs the following: it (1) breaks
down the given time interval into shorter time periods using
a sliding time window, (2) deploys an exponential decay
function of the form f(x) = e−αx to account for the time-
decay effect, and (3) takes average of the causality values
computed over each sliding time window. Formally, ξIk is
defined as follows, where k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb}:
ξIk(i) =
1
|T |
∑
t′∈T
e−σ(t−t
′) × E∆k (i) (7)
where σ is a scaling parameter of the exponential decay
function, T = {t′|t′ = t0 + j × δ, j ∈ N ∧ t′ ≤ t − δ} is
a sequence of sliding-time windows, and δ is a small fixed
amount of time, which is used as the length of each sliding-
time window ∆ = [t′−δ, t′] (Figure 2). To apply the threshold-
based approach, we once again use a threshold of 0.7 for
all metrics except ξIrel for which we used a threshold of 7
(Table III).
Early Detection of PSMs. Given action log A, and user
u where ∃t s.t. (u,m, t) ∈ A, our goal is to determine if u’s
account shall be suspended given its causality vector xu ∈ Rd
(here, d = 4) computed using any of the causality metrics over
[t− δ, t+ δ].
B. Leveraging Community Structure Aspects of Causality
To answer the research question posed earlier, since net-
work structure is not available, we need to build a graph
G = (V,E) from A by connecting any pairs of users who
have posted same message chronologically. In this graph, V
is a set of vertices (i.e. users) and E is a set of directed edges
between users. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of
generality, we make the edges of this graph undirected. Next,
we leverage the LOUVAIN algorithm [21] to find the partitions
C = {C1, C2, ..., Ck} of k communities over G. Among
a myriad of the community detection algorithms [22]–[24],
we chose LOUVAIN due to its fast runtime and scalability–
we leave examining other community detection algorithms to
future work. Next, we perform the two-sample t-test H0 :
va ≥ vb, H1 : va < vb. The null hypothesis is: users in a
given community establish weak causal relations with each
other as opposed to the other users in other communities.
We construct two vectors va and vb as follows. We create va
TABLE III
F1-SCORE RESULTS FOR PSM ACCOUNTS USING EACH DECAY-BASED METRIC WITH AND WITHOUT COMMUNITIES.
Metric F1-score (without/with communities)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
ξIK&M 0.44/0.49 0.46/0.51 0.47/0.52 0.5/0.54 0.53/0.57
ξIrel 0.36/0.4 0.38/0.43 0.39/0.46 0.41/0.49 0.42/0.5
ξInb 0.52/0.56 0.53/0.57 0.54/0.58 0.56/0.6 0.59/0.61
ξIwnb 0.54/0.57 0.55/0.58 0.57/0.6 0.58/0.62 0.6/0.63
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Fig. 3. Left to right: distributions of active and inactive users using communities and ξIk when k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb}.
by computing Euclidean distances between causality vectors
(xi,xj) corresponding to each pair of users (ui, uj) who
are from same community Cl ∈ C. Therefore, va contains
exactly 12
∑|C|
l=1 |Cl|.(|Cl| − 1) elements. We construct vb of
size
∑|C|
l=1 |Cl| by computing Euclidean distance between each
user ui in community Cl ∈ C, and a random user uk
chosen from the rest of the communities, i.e., C \ Cl. The
null hypothesis is rejected at significance level α = 0.01
with the p-value of 4.945e-17. We conclude that users in
same communities are more likely to establish stronger causal
relationships with each other than the rest of the communities.
The answer to the question is thus positive. For brevity, we
only reported results for 10% of the training set, while making
similar arguments for other percentages is straightforward.
Figure 3 shows box plots of the distributions of users using
the decay-based metrics and the communities and same set of
thresholds as before. We observe a clear distinction between
active/suspended accounts, using the community structure.
Results in Table III show improvements over previous ones.
Algorithm 1 Causal Community Detection-Based Classifi-
cation Algorithm (C2DC)
Require: Training samples {x1, ...,xN} , tests {x′1, ...,x′n}, G, k
Ensure: Predicted labels {y′1, ..., y′n}
1: C← LOUVAIN(G)
2: for each x′i do
3: Cl ← C′ ∈ C s.t. x′i ∈ C′
4: D← {}
5: for each xj ∈ Cl do
6: dij ← ||x′i − xj ||2
7: D← D ∪ {dij}
8: end for
9: K← KNN(D, k)
10: y′i ← DOMINANT-LABEL(K)
11: end for
First step of the proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1) involves
finding the communities. In the second step, each unlabeled
user is classified based on the available labels of her nearby
peers in the same community. We use the K-NEAREST
NEIGHBORS (KNN) algorithm to compute her k nearest neigh-
bors in the same community, based on Euclidean distances
between their causality vectors. We label her based on the
majority class of her k nearest neighbors in the community.
The merit of using community structure over merely using
KNN is, communities can give finer-grained and more accurate
sets of neighbors sharing similar causality scores.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We use different subsets of size x% of the entire time-line
(from Feb 22, 2016 to May 27, 2016) of the action log A,
by varying x as {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. For each subset and user
i in the subset, we compute feature vector xi ∈ R4 of the
corresponding causality scores. The feature vectors are then
fed into supervised classifiers and the community detection-
based algorithm. For the sake of fair comparison, we perform
this for both causal and decay-based metrics. For both metrics,
we empirically found that ρ = 0.1 and α = 0.001 work well.
For the decay-based causality metric we shall also assume a
sliding window of size of 5 days (i.e. δ = 5) and set σ = 0.001
which were found to work well in our experiments. Note we
only present results for PSMs. Among many other supervised
classifiers such as ADABOOST , LOGISTIC REGRESSION and
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES (SVM), RANDOM FOREST
(RF) with 200 estimators and ‘entropy’ criterion, achieved
the best performance. Therefore, for brevity we only report
results when RF is used as the classifier.
We present results for the proposed community detection-
based framework and causal and decay-based metrics. For
computing k nearest neighbors, we set k = 10 as it was
found to work well for our problem. By reporting the results of
KNN trained on the decay-based causality features, we stress
that using KNN alone does not yield a good performance. For
the sake of fair comparison, all approaches were implemented
and run in Python 2.7x, using the scikit-learn package. For
any approach that requires special tuning of parameters, we
conducted grid search to choose the best set of parameters.
A. Baseline Methods
1) CAUSAL [3]: We compare our metrics against the ones
in [3] via supervised and community detection settings.
2) SENTIMETRIX-DBSCAN [25]: This was the winner of
the DARPA challenge. It uses several features such as tweet
syntax (e.g., average number of hashtags, average number of
links), tweet semantics (e.g., LDA topics), and user behavior
(e.g., tweet frequency). We perform 10-fold cross validation
and use a held-out test set for evaluation. This baseline uses a
seed set of 100 active and 100 inactive accounts, and then use
DBSCAN clustering algorithm to find the associated clusters.
Available labels are propagated to nearby unlabeled users in
each cluster based on the Euclidean distance metric, and labels
of the remaining accounts are predicted using SVM.
3) SENTIMETRIX-RF: This is a variant of [25] where we
excluded the DBSCAN part and instead trained RF classifier
using only the above features to evaluate the feature set.
B. Identification of PSM Accounts
For each subset a separate 10-fold cross validation was
performed (Figure 4). We observe the following:
• Community detection achieves the best performance us-
ing several metrics. This aligns well with the t-test
results discussed earlier: taking into account community
structure of PSMs can boost the performance.
• Causal and decay-based metrics mostly achieve higher
performance than other approaches via both settings.
• Decay-based metrics are effective at identifying PSMs at
different intervals via both settings. This lies at the inher-
ent difference between decay-based and causal metrics–
our metrics take into account time-decay effect.
• Although both variants of SENTIMETRIX-DBSCAN use
many features, they were unable to defeat our approach.
C. Timeliness of PSM Accounts Identification
For each approach, we would like to see how many of PSMs
who were active in the first 10 days of the dataset, are correctly
classified (i.e., true positives) as time goes by. Also, we need
to keep track of false positives to ensure given approach
does not merely label each instance as positive– otherwise a
trivial approach that always label each instance as PSM would
achieve highest performance. We are also interested to figure
how many days need to pass to find these accounts. We train
each classifier using 50% of the first portion of the dataset,
and use a held-out set of the rest for evaluation. Next, we pass
along the misclassified PSMs to the next portions to see how
many of them are captured over time. We repeat the process
until reaching 50% of the dataset– each time we increase the
training set by adding new instances of the current portion.
There are 14,841 users in the first subset from which 3,358
users are PSMs. Table IV shows the number of users from the
first portion that (1) are correctly classified as PSM (out of
3,358), (2) are incorrectly classified as PSM (out of 29,617),
over time. Community detection approaches were able to
detect all PSMs who were active in the first 10 days of our
dataset, no later than a month from their first activity. DECAY-
C2DC, identified all of these PSMs in about 20 days since
the first time they posted a message. Also, both causal and
decay-based metrics when fed to RF classifier, identified all
of the PSMs in the first period. SENTIMETRIX-DBSCAN and
SENTIMETRIX-RF failed to detect all PSMs from the first
portion, even after passing 50 days since their first activity.
Furthermore, these two baselines generated much higher rates
of false positives compared to the rest. The observations we
make here are in line with the previous ones: the proposed
community detection-based framework is more effective and
efficient than the rivals.
V. RELATED WORK
Social Spam/Bot Detection. Recently, DARPA organized a
Twitter bot challenge to detect “influence bots” [25]. The work
of [26], used similarity to cluster accounts and uncover groups
of malicious users. The work of [27] presented a supervised
framework for bot detection which uses more than thousands
features. Our work does not deploy any types user related
attributes. For a comprehensive survey on the ongoing efforts
to fight social bots, we direct the reader to [28].
Fake News Identification. A growing body of research is
addressing the impact of bots in manipulating political dis-
cussion, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election [29]
and the 2017 French election [30]. For example, [29] analyzes
tweets following recent U.S. presidential election and found
evidences that bots played key roles in spreading fake news.
Extremism Detection. The work of [7] designed a behavioral
model to detect extremists. Authors in [31] performed iterative
vertex clustering and classification to identify Islamic Jihadists
on Twitter. Our work also differs from these works as we do
not use network/user attributes.
Detection of Water Armies. Works of [10], [32] used user be-
havioral and domain-specific attributes to detect water armies.
Causal Reasoning. As opposed to [16], [19], [33] which deal
with preconditions as single atomic propositions, we use rules
with preconditions of more than one atomic propositions. Also,
neither of [3], [16] have addressed early detection of PSMs.
VI. CONCLUSION
We enriched the existing causal inference framework to
suite the problem of early identification of PSMs. We proposed
time-decay causal metrics which reached F1-score of 0.6 and
via supervised learning identified 71% of the PSMs from the
first 10 days of the dataset. We proposed a causal community
detection-based classification algorithm, by leveraging com-
munity structure of PSMs and their causality. We achieved the
precision of 0.84 for detecting PSMs within 10 days around
their activity; the misclassified accounts were then detected 10
days later. Our future plan includes exploring other community
detection algorithms and other forms of causal metrics.
Fig. 4. Precision, recall, F1-score and AUC results for each classifier. Experiments were run using 10-fold cross validation.
TABLE IV
TRUE/FALSE POSITIVES FOR PSM ACCOUNTS. NUMBERS ARE OUT OF 3,358/29,617 PSM/NORMAL ACCOUNTS FROM THE FIRST PERIOD. LAST
COLUMN SHOWS THE NUMBER OF PSM ACCOUNTS FROM THE FIRST PERIOD WHICH WERE NOT CAUGHT.
Learner True Positives/False Positives Remaining
02/22-03/02 03/02-03/12 03/12-03/22 03/22-03/31 03/31-04/09
DECAY-C2DC 3,072/131 286/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0
CAUSAL-C2DC 3,065/156 188/20 105/0 0/0 0/0 0
DECAY-KNN 2,198/459 427/234 315/78 109/19 96/0 213
DECAY-RF 2,472/307 643/263 143/121 72/68 28/0 0
CAUSAL-RF 2,398/441 619/315 221/169 89/70 51/0 0
SENTIMETRIX-RF 2,541/443 154/0 93/0 25/0 14/0 531
SENTIMETRIX-DBSCAN 2,157/2,075 551/5,332 271/209 92/118 72/696 215
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